Objectivism rejects Materialism?

[Cashel Kinnane]

Objectivism rejects the mind-body dichotomy, holding that the mind and body are an integrated whole, neither one of which can exist without the other, and neither of which can be interchanged between persons. Objectivism therefore rejects not only theism and idealism but also materialism, as well as any value judgment that is based upon a dichotomy between mind and body. Objectivism does not propose or favor any particular metaphysical or scientific explanation of the relationship between mind and body. (emphasis added)

First, a disclaimer -- I'm a scientist first and foremost, so I'm a little rusty on the subtle differences between some defined schools of thought. Being insatiably curious, though, I'm going to give armchair philosophy a try.

I've always considered myself a materialist/naturalist, and was surprised to read the above when I did some research on objectivism. I was nodding and agreeing with most of what I'd read until the phrase about rejecting materialism.

Given that materialism holds the position that mental events can be exclusively reduced to physical causes and effects, it seems to agree with the rejection of a mind/body dichotomy. In the trio of philosophies I emphasized in the above quote, I can't find much in common between materialism and theism or idealism. From what I see, the implication is that materialism is being rejected for similar reasons -- and yet materialism holds relevant beliefs that are polar opposites of the other two.

Perhaps the answer is in the last sentence. The only explanation I can see is that objectivism rejects materialism because the latter makes a claim that goes one step beyond the tenets of the former: Objectivism doesn't favor any particular explanation of the connection between the mind and the body, while materialism does. But that's sort of like saying a Catholic is not a theist because he goes one step further in defining the nature of God. But regardless, I disagree with this last point: Objectivism rejects the idea of a mind/body dichotomy -- that, to me, is indeed favoring a metaphysical/scientific explanation of the mind/body relationship, in that they are, effectively, one and the same.

[Joe diNimiki]

Materialism in science isn't what it is in philosophy. In science, materialism nearly stands for realism - rejection of any magic in the metaphysics of the world. In philosophy, one of the statements of materialism is that there is no such thing as free will. This is the very reason why anybody believing in the human mind, and more than everything an objectivist, can't agree with materialism.

[Cashel Kinnane]

Ahh, I see. Yes, I was indeed more familiar with the scientific definition (hence my confusion).

You've made me revisit my philosophical leanings, though, because my scientific beliefs and my philosophical ones aren't in synch. Scientifically, I think all effects have a cause, and all causes are materialistic. That would preclude free will, however, which I do believe in.

Hmm......

[Joe diNimiki]

You've made me revisit my philosophical leanings, though, because my scientific beliefs and my philosophical ones aren't in synch. Scientifically, I think all effects have a cause, and all causes are materialistic. That would preclude free will, however, which I do believe in.

Would not. With quantum mechanics, we now know that even if all effects have a cause, the causality relation is only a probability - hence the free will. E.g. we know that running naked in the street is a very bad idea, but we can still do it.

[Cashel Kinnane]

You'd be right, if I wasn't a naturalist. I'm more on Einstein's page with regard to quantum theory than Hawking's -- I don't think that quantum events are truly random and truly causeless. I think there exists some causal factor that we do not understand. From this, it would follow that all actions have causes and, more importantly, all actions are merely the predictable outcomes of preceding causes. Scientifically, that is what I believe is the most logical outcome from our current understanding of reality; any other conclusion is wishful thinking and special pleading.

After a bit of consideration, I do not believe that free will is truly 'free.' However, for now, without understanding the nature of cause and effect (and I do accept that it may be utterly incomprehensible, existing outside of the time, space and framework of reality that we are able to conceive), we cannot act on this knowledge. We behave as if we have free will, we philosophise as if we have free will, because any restrictions to our will are ultimately incomprehensible. This leads to the possibility that there may, in fact, be ultimate limitations on our ability to understand the reality we are a part of -- limitations built into the very stuff of our consciousness.

[redick]

This leads to the possibility that there may, in fact, be ultimate limitations on our ability to understand the reality we are a part of -- limitations built into the very stuff of our consciousness.

Happens to be my own personal position.

Then on the topic of Cause & Effect. As we observe the world, and realize that all Effects have a Cause, I can not but start attempting to traverse the timeline in reverse .... and what then would be the First Cause?

That thing from which all other Causes & Effects flow from. For me, this thing would be God.

[Cashel Kinnane]

Ah, but our conceptual understanding of cause and effect only applies within the framework of a timeline -- cause comes before effect, and effect comes after cause.

The event that began our universe ('First Event,' if you will, to parallel First Cause) is also, many theorize (including Hawking and Penrose), the beginning of time. By definition, cause precedes effect. If the effect is the beginning of time, there can be nothing preceding it. There can be no First Cause to the First Effect. Hawking said it best when he claimed that asking 'What happened before the Big Bang?' is analogous to asking 'What is north of the North Pole?'

It is an impossible question with no logical answer.

The result, then, is that the Cosmological Argument for God (ie. 'someone had to start the Universe') is inherently flawed (at least, if one adheres to the theory that the Big Bang also began time -- and there are few theoretical physicists who do not). Moreover, it only moves the problem back a step -- who caused God? And if God had no cause, then why couldn't the Universe be causeless?

I should rephrase my position: Anything within a timeline has a cause. The 'beginning' of that timeline, and whatever answer can be, somehow, tied to the impossible question 'what caused it,' will forever be beyond our capacity to comprehend. We exist within time, our thoughts are inextricably bound to it, everything down to the most insignificant minutae of quantum behaviour in our brains happens exclusively within the timestream. It is thus impossible to perceive that timestream from outside of it.

[Gage]

Good points

[musashi]

There is also a position for the oscillating universe. In which the gravitational effects upon all the matter within the universe causes a collapse to such a great subatomic compression that a big bang occurs. Call this the mother of all singularities! Of course this idea just moves us farther along the sequence. Who caused the oscillating universe?

Taking the thread a different direction...

Referring back to the definition in original post, what if the definer intended the "matter" concept of materialism? If we consider the objective power of the mind as influencing and controlling the world around us, isn't matter just the medium in which we work. An artist does not appreciate paint for the sake of paint but rather for the art that can be created from it.

Perhaps what the definer was intending is that an objectivist does not fixate upon the material, but rather upon his own capacity to use material to create some greater art. Further, the Objectivist with this capacity does not submit the products of his mind altruistically, submissively for others to exploit. Rather the Objectivist demands full and fair compensation for the societal contribution of the art. This compensation is not the ambition of the artist, or even a coveted prize, it is a statement of their position within the world.

I believe from this perspective you might concluded that the Objectivist is not a materialist. Though the accumulation of material might be used as a metric for the individual's creativity. It is the capacity that is coveted by the Objectivist.

Perhaps one more example might, close my post out cleanly. There are two equal sized piles of firewood split for burning. Behind one pile stands John Henry splitting maul in hand. Behind the other pile sits a simple and efficient splitting machine; with the capacity of 10 John Henry's. The objectivist clears the vision of the piles of wood away as immaterial. The objectivist looks past the Herculean capacity of the inferior alternative. The objectivist celebrates the machine with the capacity of ten men; and celebrates the mind that conceived and created the machine.

[Endeavor]

I believe that the reason Objectivism rejects Materialism is that, in Objectivism's view, equating all mental events with physical events in the mind then holding that all matter is subject to particular laws of physics amounts to determinism. That would oppose free will, one of the most integral concepts of Objectivism.

However, if you hold that physical determinism and free will are not fundamentally opposed to one another, then there is no conflict between objectivism and materialism whatsoever.

The nature of free will is that we do what we want to do. What we want to do is based on our thoughts, not something drawn from pure randomness. Our very thoughts are grounded in physical reality, so the fact that our actions in physical reality may follow from them is no surprise.

The essential problem arises when people equate free will with multiple possible realities. There is only one possible reality, the one in which our actions are based on what we wish to do, and where what we wish to do is based upon our thoughts, which are grounded in physical reality.

On a tangental note, I believe it logically follows that even supposedly "random" subatomic particle movements follow laws of motion and rationality. Because we can't measure the position of a particle without disturbing its position doesn't mean that it isn't in a particular position at a particular moment in time. Because we don't understand the reasons that these particles move the way they do doesn't mean that they move in a random fashion. Because of this, I do not believe it is logical that random deviations in subatomic particles would result in truly random events. If we had a perfect understanding of the laws under which they operate and the computational power to extrapolate their motions (although both of these conditions may be impossible to meet simply because of physical limitations), they could be predicted just as any other physical phenomena.

Looking at it from this point of view, I see no conflict between physical determinism and free will.