Absolute Truth

[Arakasi Takeda]

Quote:
One and only rule:
Do not make claims that Objectivism says something without a direct quote from one of Objectivist works.

Does this rule stand for just Objectivism, or will it be applied to all philosophical counter-arguments?

In other words, if you claim that something from 'Popper, Kant, or all the others' is retarded, will you be supplying a direct quote from those works?


AT

[Arakasi Takeda]

AT, a person interested in a discussion about some topic makes it their business to know what they are talking about. Instead, you are trying to talk (I mean refute) Objectivism, without having a damn clue what it is. There is not a single post when you do not make fabricated assumptions about Objectivism, then continue to discuss them in length. This is not a person interested in debate or in knowledge.

Well, perhaps you came here with a complete and absolute encyclopedic knowledge of Objectivism. I have admited that I did not. Where I have made assumptions, it has been based off of what exposure I have had. Where I have misinterpreted, Olek particularly has been quick to 'correct' me. Perhaps you don't count that as a learning experience - I do. Since I don't claim to be an expert on the subject, having Olek present Objectivist tenants in ways other than the direct quotes is something I consider instructional.

If I were an expert already, I wouldn't need to learn it by coming here, would I?

This is a person interested in listening to his own pretty words and ideas.

This coming from a man who presented complete nonsense in pseudo-mathematical form in order to make himself sound more intelligent? Please, spare me.

Just to give a small example: Oleksandr asked you what is the standard you use to judge if a proof is good or not. You replied with a dialoge describing how ridiculous he sounds while explaining an axiom.

If the explaination sounds ridiculous, I point it out. He's had no problem insulting me the same way, so why should I act differently. Why do you think I should obey a different standard of ettiquete when he, and you, will not?

You want a standard to judge whether or not a proof is good? That's easy - If the proof is generated is basic logical form, following reason without contradiction or appeal to logical fallacy, for which the premises are themselves self consistent and can be reasonably asserted as true, and from which the conclusions flow necessarily from the stated premises, then the proof would be judged as 'good'.

I am certain that you do not want to learn: you want to prove. You do not want to learn, You want to appear as if you've proven something.

From this statement, I am certain of two things - one, that you can both be certain and wrong and two, that you don't believe that 'learning' can arise from 'proving', which, since deduction is the basis for creating knowledge, means you don't have the faintest clue what you are talking about.

It would appear that you suffer from displacement. You like sounding logical and high-minded, but since you are incapable of doing so, you feel you must claim that I am the same way.

Look, this is getting tiresome. Do you want to go back and forth slinging insults to no purpose, or would you like to actually try to discuss some philosophy? I will put away my ego if you will do the same, and we can attempt to start over at the beginning. Tolthar and I are finally have a somewhat engaging discussion - we could do the same.

Why not just try answering the first question posed - Do you believe there is such a thing as 'absolute truth known for certain'? To make sure we start the discussion on the same page, how would you define each of those terms, so that the epistomology becomes the primary support for the truth value (True or False) you would ascribe to that statement?


AT

[Oleksandr]

So, AT, according to your views of what we can be certain of: that we can't be certain of truth but can be certain of falsehood, the following passage makes sense?

"I'm not sure if I'm a human but I'm sure I'm not a donkey."

[Outsider]

Look, this is getting tiresome. Do you want to go back and forth slinging insults to no purpose, or would you like to actually try to discuss some philosophy? I will put away my ego if you will do the same, and we can attempt to start over at the beginning. Tolthar and I are finally have a somewhat engaging discussion - we could do the same.

What you see as "insults" are not meant as such. The purpose of saying what I think is the hope that you would recognize it yourself and change your attitude. But that requires honesty. I don't think you are honest though. Like I said, you want to prove something, not to learn or thoroughly think of things.
If someone has honest curiosity and wants to make sense out of things - I would have endless patience to go through all the fine details and invest a lot of thought into discussing all possible problems. But when someone is out to prove something, without the stage of honest thinking (i.e. if they are not interested in the truth, but are interested in proving their point regardless of truth) then I don't see a point engaging in discussion.
And this is the case with you.
I think whoever is discussing things with you is wasting his time.

Just to clarify a finer point: I enjoy discussions with none-Objectivists. I've had plenty of discussions with someone who asked plenty of difficult questions. So this is not at all about avoiding discussion because of difference in opinions. This is avoiding a discussion because I don't believe you honestly want to make sense or to learn.

[Arakasi Takeda]

So, AT, according to your views of what we can be certain of: that we can't be certain of truth but can be certain of falsehood, the following passage makes sense?

"I'm not sure if I'm a human but I'm sure I'm not a donkey."

No - falsification is not 'falsehood', as you are using it. It has a far more precise definition.

Falsification is the process of finding contradiction between a hypothesis and a physical observation. Hypothesis yield predictions, which can be tested. Those predictions are derived by deduction from the hypothesis, so, if there is a contradiction, then it must be the result of a flawed premise within the hypothesis itself. Deduction, if followed using proper logical form, are always true if their premises are also true.

When a hypothesis yields a prediction, and the prediction does not match the physical observation, then the hypothesis must be modified to remove the incorrect premise.

The reason your statement is incorrect is because you are improperly generalizing my statements to yield false epistomology. While it may be your personal opinion that philosophers other than Rand and Aristotle play fast and loose with definitions, that doesn't mean your opinion is correct. If you wish me to be precise about the definitions used by Objectivism, then you must also abide by the same rules and use Popperian terms like Falsification in their exact epistomological meaning. Otherwise you are as guilty of deliberate misinterpretation as you claim I am.


AT

[Tolthar Lockbar]

1) How are you defining the word 'Knowledge' in the context of this discussion.

Knowledge is just some fact, reached through either induction, or using deduction on some induction. And all this process of reason implies an observer. Knowledge can not exists without someone to have that knowledge.

2) You hold that induction is of equal 'value' to deduction - (by which you seem to imply utility). From that, can I assume that you would hold that knowledge arrived at by induction is as certain as knowledge arrived at by deduction?

No, deduction is only as certain as the induction it is based on. They do not hold equal value at all. Induction is the primary that allows for deduction. Without induction, one couldn't even use deduction because there would be no facts to deduce from.

3) The ongoing discussion with Olek has been over whether any knowledge can be know as 'certain' - based on your responses to the first two questions, do you hold that knowledge derived from induction is certain or merely useful?

Certain to who? I can be certain about my own knowledge. It doesn't mean I didn't made an error however. Taking certain out of the context of 'certain to who' is a false concept.

4) As a further clarification, it might to useful to know how you and Olek are defining 'certain', in this context.

Certainty has a context. Its context is the induction and deduction used by the person who claims certainty. If it is certain to him/her, then it is certain to him/her.

My problem with your method is that its goal is to have some omnipotent knowledge. But accepting that you can't, and ever working towards it still. That seems pointless and backwards. You are trying to clear up the facts towards some false concept called 'absolute truth' (in the platonic fashion) even though you use different words.

One should work to understand and discover new facts, and re-evaluate old ones only when a contradiction is found. It is to use logic as an affirmative, not as a negative. New facts and discoveries bring new knowledge, and finds old errors. Even if someone deduces some contradiction, that deduction is based on induction anyways. It is pointless to give deduction any more usefulness than induction.

[Arakasi Takeda]

Tolthar wrote:
Knowledge is just some fact, reached through either induction, or using deduction on some induction. And all this process of reason implies an observer. Knowledge can not exists without someone to have that knowledge.

It probably depends on what you mean by 'fact' in the above, but I would propose that Knowledge is a statement or concept, arrived at through induction or deduction by an observer, but which also contains an element of truthfulness.

By truthfulness I mean "corresponding directly to an observation, or arrived at through deduction from a direct observation".

Anyone can make a statement based on what they see, but for it to be 'Knowledge', it must be a true statement. That may be what you mean when you say the word 'fact', but rather than assume it, I'll spell it out explicitly. Otherwise, I think we'd agree on the use of this definition for knowledge.

Tolthar wrote:
No, deduction is only as certain as the induction it is based on. They do not hold equal value at all. Induction is the primary that allows for deduction. Without induction, one couldn't even use deduction because there would be no facts to deduce from.

Tolthar wrote:
Certain to who? I can be certain about my own knowledge. It doesn't mean I didn't made an error however. Taking certain out of the context of 'certain to who' is a false concept.

I believe you above statement contains a couple of errors that must be carefully parsed.

First "deduction is only as certain as the induction it is based on" - In Logic, a deduction is a logical construction that yields conclusions from a set of premises, such that, if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. That is the definition of certainty. If X then Y is certain, provided proper logical form is used. You seem to be using the term 'certain' in a common venacular meaning, meaning "I'm sure of it". That's a personal opinion and, as you say, could be held in error. But in Logic, there is a definition of "certain" that is based not on the person, but on the logical form itself. That is the definition of certain I am using. A piece of knowledge is "certain" if it is the end result of proper application of logical form.

Now, saying that a deduction is only as true as its premises, and saying that those premises are the result of a logical induction arrives at something close to your statement that I could agree with. If the initial premises we start with are false, then any deduction we arrive at from them would also be false, but it would be certainly false, because that is the outcome demanded by proper logical form.

When I say that deduction is more valuable than induction, I mean the following:

Logic demands that if the premises of a deduction are true, and proper logical form is maintained, the conclusion must also be true.

There is no corresponding rule for induction.

In fact, premises based on logical induction cannot be said to be 'certain' in the same way, because induction itself is based on a logical fallacy (generalization from the specific to the general). The outcome of this fact is that any knowledge which ultimately rests on a logical induction cannot be said to be 'certain', if by certain you mean flowing from proper logical form. Their foundation is shaky, so the whole edifice is also shaky. That was the argument I was attempting to make to Olek when I said that Knowledge was not certain. I did not mean that I was 'not sure of it', using your common use. I meant that Knowledge based on induction is not guaranteed to be true by means of appeal to logical form.

Tolthar wrote:
Certainty has a context. Its context is the induction and deduction used by the person who claims certainty. If it is certain to him/her, then it is certain to him/her.

I argue above that you are not using the same definition of certainty that I am - probably the cause of some of our misunderstanding. I am using 'certainty' as defined by a result that must be obtained if proper logical form is applied. You are using it as a measure of confidence a person has in 'what they know'. I would prefer to call what you are describing exactly that - "confidence". The "Confidence" a person has in the truth-value of a particular piece of knowledge, based on their own observations and reasoning skills, could be a "value" we could discuss - a value that may or may not be correct, based on the individual's perceptions/reasoning.

My problem with your method is that its goal is to have some omnipotent knowledge. But accepting that you can't, and ever working towards it still. That seems pointless and backwards. You are trying to clear up the facts towards some false concept called 'absolute truth' (in the platonic fashion) even though you use different words.

One should work to understand and discover new facts, and re-evaluate old ones only when a contradiction is found. It is to use logic as an affirmative, not as a negative. New facts and discoveries bring new knowledge, and finds old errors. Even if someone deduces some contradiction, that deduction is based on induction anyways. It is pointless to give deduction any more usefulness than induction.

In your first paragraph, you ascribe to me the exact opposite view from the one I hold. I have never claimed anything about 'omnipotent knowledge' (by which, I think you mean, ominscience). I have said all along that knowledge is uncertain - that we don't know anything about 'Absolute Truth'. Olek is the one asking me if I am 'absolutely sure' of such statements. You need to direct your criticism of absolute truth to him, not me.

Your second paragraph is more puzzling - you say we should work to discover 'new facts' and 're-evaluate old ones when contradictions are found'.

Isn't that what I have been describing this whole time? The whole point of falsification is finding contradictions between hypotheses (groupings of logical inductions) and physical observations - when a contradiction occurs, one must re-evalutate the hypothesis in light of this new observation. I have been describing exactly what you just wrote, but you seem to think I am talking about something completely different.

What makes falsification work is that it is based on logical certainty. Again, if we assume that premises are true, then a deduction flowing from those premises must also be true. So, if we make a deduction from a grouping of premises (hypothesis), and that deduction (prediction) is contradicted by physical observation, then at least one of the premises within the hypothesis must be false. We then go back and change the hypothesis. This all works because of the rules of deduction. Our Knowledge (the sum of our hypotheses) get's better and better because we are removing false ones as we go.

To relate that back to 'absolute truth', are you suggesting that the goal of making 'better and better hypothesis' is to achieve some 'omniscient truth' about reality? Because if that is what you are ascribing to me, then what do you call your own statments about learning from your errors? Wouldn't that be the same thing? I would not say that the goal of Popper is to achieve some 'absolute truth', because that would require absolute certainty (in the logical sense) of all of our Knowledge, which is not achievable. The goal of Popper is NOT absolute truth - it's making better and better hypothesis about something for which there is always uncertainty.

But whatever you think is the goal of what you are describing, you can't achieve better hypotheses by induction alone. I don't understand what you mean by stating that logic is an 'affirmative' process. Because knowledge gained by induction is not certain, in the logical sense, you have no way of discerning truth from falsehood in your premises. You can only achieve that via deduction and falsification.

I believe, however, that you are 'missing the trees by concentrating on the forest' - you have described the idea that you can learn new things and remove old errors by observation over time. What I think you are failing to describe is exactly how you achieve those two objectives. If you examine your methods more closely, I think you'd see that any improvement you make to your premises based on contradiction is actually based on the rules of deduction. Adding new ideas may be induction, but you never obtain a measure of their truth-value without testing them, and testing them again involves deduction and falsification.


AT

[Tolthar Lockbar]

In your first paragraph, you ascribe to me the exact opposite view from the one I hold. I have never claimed anything about 'omnipotent knowledge' (by which, I think you mean, ominscience). I have said all along that knowledge is uncertain - that we don't know anything about 'Absolute Truth'. Olek is the one asking me if I am 'absolutely sure' of such statements. You need to direct your criticism of absolute truth to him, not me.

I first need to clarify. I am aware that you said that you think the opposite. What I am saying, however, is that your method accepts the platonic concept of truth, and then tries to approach it, but knowing that you never will.

I think I put a '.' where I should of but a ',' so I was unclear the first time.

[Tolthar Lockbar]

that Knowledge is a statement or concept, arrived at through induction or deduction by an observer, but which also contains an element of truthfulness.

By truthfulness I mean "corresponding directly to an observation, or arrived at through deduction from a direct observation".

Looks to me like a cyclic definition. And it think it is because we have different definitions of induction.

First you say that knowledge is a concept arrived at through induction (an abstraction from _our_ observations) or deduction by someone, which contains an element of truthfulness. Then you basically say that truthfulness is using induction or deduction on induction.

I think this needs to be cleared up first, then I'll move on to the rest.

[Arakasi Takeda]

Tolthar wrote:
First need to clarify. I am aware that you said that you think the opposite. What I am saying, however, is that your method accepts the platonic concept of truth, and then tries to approach it, but knowing that you never will.

I still don't understand where you are drawing this inference from; The goal of Popperian falsification is to take a hypothesis (A single concept made of a group of induction statements) and 'improve it' by removing contradictions between deductions made from those premises and direct physical observations. Where do you see 'Platonic Truth' entering into that goal?

I don't see it as being any different than your statement that "One should work to understand and discover new facts, and re-evaluate old ones when a contradiction is found." I would assume that you mean by the above statement that you wish to "improve your knowledge" by assessing new observations and eliminating contradictions.

I suppose I should ask what you would mean by the statement "improve your knowledge", if my inference is correct. What, if any, would be your standard for evaluating knowledge as being improved or not? Do you see what I am explaining as trying to compare improvement against some objective standard you are defining as 'Platonic Truth'? If so, I think you are making an error made by a lot of non-Popperians.

To try to make it clearer, and since Outsider added mathematical formulism to this thread, let me try to explain where you might be making that mistake.

Let us define a value, N, which is the number of contradictions within a particular Popperian hypothesis. The value of N is uncertain, because we don't have any information on the exact number of possible contradictions existing in the real world for a particular induction from specific observations to a general statement. We do know, however, that N is a positive integar. There's no such thing as 'half a contradiction' - either a statement matches direct observation or not. We also know that N is positive - there's no such thing as a 'negative contradiction'.

We can use N to define a second value, C, which is it's inverse. The C value of a hypothesis is a measure of the group of inductions correspondence to real observations. The higher the C value, the less inherent contradictions are contained in the hypothesis, and the closer the induction corresponds to direct physical observation. Again, the exact value of C is uncertain, because N is uncertain. These are simply relative values.

Since N is a positive integer, the following mathematical statement is true. (N) is always greater than (N-1). Similarly, the inverse of N is always less than the inverse of (N-1). So as N decreases, C increases.

The goal of Popperian falsification is to increase C; to remove contradiction (go from N to N-1), and subsequently increase the correspondence of the hypothesis to direct physical observation.

That is as far as a Popperian would go. C is uncertain, but the relative value of C can be increased through falsification.


What several non-Popperian's mistakenly do, and what you may also be doing, is making an additional unfounded statement. They suggest that as N approaches zero, C approaches infinity. They then define infinite C as complete and absolute correspondence to 'Truth', by which they mean "Platonic Truth". Finally, they use this definition to go back and suggest that the goal of Popperian falsification is to get closer and closer to 'Platonic Truth'. In essence, they have created their own false definition, and then tacked it onto Popper in order to satisfy a need to include 'Platonic Truth' in the philosophy.

Popper balked at the idea that such a thing as 'Platonic Truth'' existed at all, and would never agree that C was a value tied to such a thing. C is a relative value of non-contradiction, not a measure of closeness to Platonic Truth.


AT

[As an aside, there is a relationship between the value of C, and the concept of Verisimilitude. They are not exactly the same, but they are related to each other. But neither is related to a concept of 'Platonic Truth'. - any such relationship is the manufacture of non-Popperians trying to make a correlation. Verisimilitude, unfortunately, is a term created by Popper to try to ease an epistomological connection, but one that is very troublesome and should really never have been created in the first place. It is completely unnecessary to the function of Popperian philosophy.]

[Arakasi Takeda]

Arakasi Takeda wrote:
that Knowledge is a statement or concept, arrived at through induction or deduction by an observer, but which also contains an element of truthfulness.

By truthfulness I mean "corresponding directly to an observation, or arrived at through deduction from a direct observation".

Tolthar wrote:
Looks to me like a cyclic definition. And it think it is because we have different definitions of induction.

First you say that knowledge is a concept arrived at through induction (an abstraction from _our_ observations) or deduction by someone, which contains an element of truthfulness. Then you basically say that truthfulness is using induction or deduction on induction.

I don't see the definition as cyclical. Defining 'Knowledge' as requiring a truth-value of 'True' allows us to separate 'knowledge' from other statements that do not correspond directly to physical observation.

For instance, suppose I have an apple in my hand.

The statement "The apple is red" could be considered knowledge. It is based on my direct physical observation, and the statement corresponds directly to that physical observation of the object and its color.

The statement "The apple is purple" would not be considered knowledge. I am making a direct observation of the object, but my statement is false because it does not correspond directly to the observation.

The statement "The apple came from the tree in my backyard" would not be considered knowledge. While it might be a true statement after further observation, it can only be called a speculation at the time I am making my observation of the apple. There is nothing to distinguish which tree an apple might have come from by observing the apple in my hand - I would have to do some further investigation.

So Knowledge must have a truth-value of 'true' so that we may separate it from statements or concepts which are actually false or unsupported.


Now, I have to be very more careful about what I refer to as 'Knowledge' when discussing Popper. You might define 'knowledge' as coming from induction or deduction, and I think, in my statement, I accidently used the word in that way. In fact, in Popper, you cannot call a Hypothesis 'knowledge', because the truth-value of any grouping of inductions is uncertain. I cannot say for sure that a hypothesis is 'True'. Again, this is because of the generalization fallacy - any statement going from specific to general, even if all the specific statements are true, does not carry the truth-value with it by appeal to logical form. It is possible the induction is true. It is also possible that at least one specific observation not yet taken would contradict it. Thus, it is uncertain and not Knowledge in the way I defined that term above.

This is why we call things like 'the Theory of Gravity' a theory; every observation we have made so far appears to support the idea of gravity, but it is not 'Knowledge', strictly defined. It is still a supposition - just a very well supported one. If Knowledge is defined as being truth-dependent, then an induction never yields Knowledge. We can have high confidence in it, but it is still uncertain.


AT

[another aside - I think I can now more formally define what I mean when I said to Olek that I am 'reasonably certain' or 'reasonably sure' of something, instead of 'absolutely certain' or 'absolutely sure' of something. Being 'reasonably certain' of a statement is to have 'high confidence' in it - so far, the hypothesis seems very well supported. It is not an absolute truth, since it is based on induction, but confidence is high because supporting observations are many.]

[Arakasi Takeda]

So, in working through the epistomologies with Tolthar, I believe I have 'diagnosed' his particular position - I submit the following for him to consider.

What you are engaging in is called Inductivism in philosophy.

Inductivism is defined thus:

The claim that inference in accordance with some version of the inductive principle is, if not logically valid, at least rationally legitimate.

[Source - http://www.philosophyprofessor.com/phil ... tivism.php]

Basically - while it may be true that inductions cannot be considered an absolute truth, because of Hume's problem of induction and the generalization fallacy, for all practical purposes, inductions yield useful statements of reality.

The easiest example is the "Sun rises in the East" induction. While it is true that, in five billion years, the sun will swell up, absorb the earth, and the above statement will lose all real meaning, for this time period (now), and for all practical purposes related to now, the induction is a useful and rational statement.

There are many other inductions of exactly the same nature. Provided one overlooks the requirement for justification by logical formulation and, instead, concentrates on the induction's "reasonabless and utility", then it is 'okay' to use induction to as a basis of knowledge.

In effect, for the "Sun example", you have intentionally limited the context of the induction to a 'useful lifetime', ignoring the extreme end (when the sun blows up), and considered the limited induction as a 'true' statement. I would object that this does not resolve Hume's problem of induction, but concede that, for all practical discussion, it's justified on grounds of 'being reasonable'.

To resolve the conflict, do not call an induction 'True' based on an appeal to logic form. Call it 'reasonable within a specific context', and understand the explicit difference between the two.


AT

[Oleksandr]

..because of Hume's problem of induction and the generalization fallacy, for all practical purposes, inductions yield useful statements of reality.

Now, we are getting somewhere.

1. Of course, Hume's problem is not a problem except for his own mental problems. (Is-ought problem was resolved by Ayn Rand long time ago.)

2. You have a hidden dichotomy between theory and practice.

I'll let Tolthar have fun with this.

[Oleksandr]

This reminds me of a time when my philosophy teacher in college introduced Hume's "problem" in a class. He went of course with blah-blah-blah, and everyone in class sits like a rabbit scared to make a noise, and just takes it in.

After the teacher was done. I asked a simple question:

"So, if I want to take notes in class, I shouldn't rip up my sheet of paper on which I write my notes?"

The teacher goes with "aha!" look in his eyes: "But that's pragmatic!" I give him wtf-that-means look. He steps back and thinks and decides that his argument wasn't strong enough. So, he proceeds with:

"Well, actually. Even in this case, I don't see how you can make a should statement here."

He repeated this sentence one more time. And I just had a look of "omg-you are a retard."

The class seemed to have recognized the truth of my statement, but didn't have any self-esteem to see the teacher as being wrong. Whimps.

P.S. I laughed at that teacher a few times during semester - I couldn't help it.

[Arakasi Takeda]

Olek wrote:
This reminds me of a time when my philosophy teacher in college introduced Hume's "problem" in a class. He went of course with blah-blah-blah, and everyone in class sits like a rabbit scared to make a noise, and just takes it in....

As amusing as laughing at your teachers may be, perhaps you'd like to outline your refutation of the Problem of Induction? It would be far more demonstrative of your ability to reason than an anecdote for which no one here has first-hand experience.

AT

[Arakasi Takeda]

It would appear that I have now received my first experience with Olek's double standard:

From Private Message:

As per forum section rule, I ask you to provide a citation and a quote of where you take point 1.


Thanks.

P.S. Until then this post was removed.

Subject: Absolute Truth


Quote:
Quote:
Olek wrote:
Now, we are getting somewhere.

1. Of course, Hume's problem is not a problem except for his own mental problems. (Is-ought problem was resolved by Ayn Rand long time ago.)

2. You have a hidden dichotomy between theory and practice.

I'll let Tolthar have fun with this.


Exactly what are you contributing to this discussion now Olek? Are your points #1 and #2 supposed to be some kind of argument?

Here, a response:

1. No, the only mental problem on this subject is Rand's. Her "Is-Ought" solution doesn't address the problem of induction at all. It doesn't resolve the generalization fallacy. It's an argument against the subjectivity of ethics (values).

2. I don't suffer from a theory/practice dichotomy. The problem is an Inductivist assertion that "utility = truth", for which there is no logical support, reasonable or not.


AT

Olek has decided that I must justify my statement about Rand's "Is-Ought" solution while he makes completely unsupported statements about Hume. I will abide by the rule, but I reprint the entirety of the Personal Message as a demonstration of his hypocritical stance towards this debate.

Rand's outline of the "Is-Ought" problem is on pg17, section entitled "Objectivist Ethics", of the book The Virtue of Selfishness.

Specifically, she states that philosophers who hold the position that ethics (values) are not directly deducable from 'reality' are incorrect. Her exact quote is:

It is only an ultimate goal, and end in itself, that makes the existence of values possible. Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action. Epistemologically, the concept of "value" is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of "life." To speak of "value" as apart from "life" is worse than a contradiction in terms. "It is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible.

In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between "is" and "ought."

The reason this is not a refutation of Hume's Problem of Induction is that it doesn't refer to induction at all. The values she is referring to are ethical values. What is defined as "good" is what is life-sustaining. What is defined as "evil" is that which ends life. Her argument is that these ethical values are objective because they are dependent on that life as their antecedent. Since the values are dependent on life, they are not subjective.

So it's an argument for objective ethics - It answers a different criticism of Hume in regards to the foundations of ethics. But that is not the problem we are discussing. We are discussing the logical fallacy of inductive reasoning.


AT

[Arakasi Takeda]

Olek wrote:
1. Of course, Hume's problem is not a problem except for his own mental problems. (Is-ought problem was resolved by Ayn Rand long time ago.)

As a further demonstration of Olek's absolute hypocrisy, he made the above claim of Rand without sourcing it. He won't even abide by his own rules.


AT

[Oleksandr]

Olek wrote:
1. Of course, Hume's problem is not a problem except for his own mental problems. (Is-ought problem was resolved by Ayn Rand long time ago.)

As a further demonstration of Olek's absolute hypocrisy, he made the above claim of Rand without sourcing it. He won't even abide by his own rules.

AT

Wrong. Where did I say that that's what Ayn Rand said? I didn't.

[Oleksandr]

So it's an argument for objective ethics - It answers a different criticism of Hume in regards to the foundations of ethics. But that is not the problem we are discussing. We are discussing the logical fallacy of inductive reasoning.

Ok, I assumed you were referring to Hume on is-ought problem, and apparently, you didn't?

Here's quote by Hume: (notice the very first few words)

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

Now, what are you talking about with regards with Hume? Show me his words that you are using.

EDIT: spelling

[Arakasi Takeda]

Arakasi Takeda wrote:

Olek wrote:
1. Of course, Hume's problem is not a problem except for his own mental problems. (Is-ought problem was resolved by Ayn Rand long time ago.)

As a further demonstration of Olek's absolute hypocrisy, he made the above claim of Rand without sourcing it. He won't even abide by his own rules.

AT

Olek wrote:
Wrong. Where did I say that that's what Ayn Rand said? I didn't.

Your rules specifically state that any claim about what Objectivism says MUST be sourced. Your statement above says that "Ayn Rand resolved the Is-Ought problem."

That is a claim about what Objectivism says about a particular philosophical issue. You did not support your statement.

Where exactly does Rand resolve the Is-Ought problem? [Hint - I've already done your work for you by responding to your PM, after you demanded of me what you wouldn't do yourself.]

You made the rule, you have to follow it.


AT

[Arakasi Takeda]

Olek wrote:
Now, what are you talking about with regards with Hume? Show me his words that you are using.

Find them yourself. You specifically stated that your rule for sourcing was for Objectivist claims only. I'm not required to do anything in regards to Hume. As you have remarked to me on several occassions, if you had actually read Hume, you'd know what I was talking about.

AT

[Oleksandr]

You made the rule, you have to follow it.

First of all, AT, I will not let you throw around insults as you did in the past at people (including Tolthar, for example). And now you throw it at me, saying that I am hypocritical by not posting the quote. If you keep up your attitude, you will removed from forums. I've had enough of your personal attacks and attitude on the forum.

Second, yes, I did indeed not link the statement. My mistake. However, I already gave you the quote to this before, but still I didn't link the post:
http://shite.homelinux.org/forum/viewto ... and#p29911

[Oleksandr]

However, taking lastest posts by AT, including:

Find them yourself. You specifically stated that your rule for sourcing was for Objectivist claims only. I'm not required to do anything in regards to Hume. As you have remarked to me on several occassions, if you had actually read Hume, you'd know what I was talking about.

AT

I'm suspending AT's posting rights from the forum due to his personal attitude of attacking people.

[Kushan]

I'm suspending AT's posting rights from the forum due to his personal attitude of attacking people.

Thank god.




...wait, god's fictional. Thank Olesandr, then! I might actually start reading this forum again

[Tolthar Lockbar]

AT's problem was one of implied context when talking about knowledge or concepts. The context he was dropping was: Knowledge has to come from someone. Concepts are human creations; humans are the only ones who can can make generalizations/abstractions/concepts.

When he says that one can't make abstractions without certainty, or can't be sure of induction, one should look at his meaning of "certain" and "sure". These concepts had to of been discovered by someone (long ago) and had to have been based on that person's (who discovered them) experiences with reality. The person who discovered them did not have all knowledge of everything, and therefor create concepts that no one else could ever use...

Induction is not about statistics as AT would have you believe, it is a generalization of ones own experiences in reality. When you say "car", you are not referring to all the cars that will and do exists ever, you are referring to all that you have experienced.

I can say that my induction is true, because I'm the one who is using the concept of car, and the one who knows what concrete examples I am referring to when using it.

Now for the real act of integration: He is saying that induction is bad because you cannot have God like knowledge. Of course, that is because God like knowledge (Platonic truth) is a false concept, and everything based on that, is therefore false. Induction is not as easy as deduction, but is 10x more useful. This is why AT was a mental suicide, because he thinks there is some inherent problem with induction, and turns instead to deduction for everything, and claims not to be certain about any induction (which means not certain about anything).

PS: This also touches on why many people don't like object oriented programming. They try to use abstractions (ex inheritance) and create concepts (ex created classes) without actually knowing what those abstractions are abstractions of, why the abstraction was made, and just generally don't understand induction.

Procedural programming is completely deduction (or close to it). The blunt of OOP is actually induction.