Absolute Truth

[Arakasi Takeda]

Olek wrote:

{ Sarcasm to follow. }

Life is an illusion. None of us are alive.

How could life ever possibly form from dead things, such as atoms and molecules?
All of them are dead, thus anything or any system that is built on them (dead things) must be dead as well?

I am glad you included the sarcasm tag - I would hope it is obvious to you that your statement is nonsensical because it flows from a false definition.

There is no 'essential quality' which we use to define life separate from death. There is no 'life force' or 'soul' which inhabits certain groupings of molecules and atoms to make one thing 'alive' (or its absence from another grouping 'dead').

Life is the name we assign to a very specific subgrouping of chemical processes - self-replicating proteins, etc. LIFE is chemistry - the interactions of those atoms and molecules, not the atoms and molecules themselves.


AT

[Arakasi Takeda]

Arakasi Takeda wrote:
And 'absolute truth' is something unreasonable, because it presupposes that you know something to be true for all time, under all conditions.

Tolthar wrote:
Can you tell me why this began? Why was the absolute thing brought up. As far as I know, Oleks or I never claimed any type of omniscient knowledge.

It starts on page two of this forum thread with the following statement from Olek:

Olek wrote:
Ok, so there are no absolute 'truths', none at all, ever, never, and whatever.

Right?

Didn't you just make an absolute statement/truth?

You can start from there to catch up on the conversation.
I believe you are correct in your second assertion though, that neither of you has claimed any kind of 'omniscient' knowledge. What I have been trying to explain is that the phrase 'absolute truth' has been used in different ways by different philosophers. Using the same phrase with differing definitions is the cause of a lot of philosophical misunderstanding, and is, in the specific case, a point of contention between myself and Olek. I believe he is using 'absolute truth' in an incorrect way in attacking my original statement.

Kant uses the phrase 'absolute truth' in the omniscient fashion - assuming a piece of knowledge can be known to be _true_ eternally, regardless of actual observation. I believe this definition of the phrase is a false one.

Objectivism uses a concept of 'absolute truth', but the definition is changed to suggest that such truths are grounded either in direct observation or are rational foundations - the rules by which reason is governed (axioms, if you will, for the process of reason).

Popper, the particular philosopher that I use as a foundation for my own understanding of reason, rejected the use of the phrase 'absolute truth' entirely, because he believed it lead to serious misunderstandings in discussions of philosophy. Rather than redefine the phrase, as Objectivism does, he just gets rid of it, and uses different epistomology. In his opinion, the phrase was too 'value-laden' to be retained (too many people understood the phrase in the Kantian definition sense, which to Popper was unworkable).

The funny thing about this thread is that Objectivism uses the phrase 'absolute truth' to mean 'grounded in observation'. Popper's falsification theory of knowledge is also 'grounded in observation'. So we start from similar foundations of knowledge. But the use of the specific language has led to yet another argument between Olek and myself on the thread, for no good reason that I can determine other than an attempt at 'gotcha' to score debate points.

Arakasi wrote:
At this time, I have not encountered any case which falsifies the hypothesis that human beings possess free will, so I am reasonably certain it exists.

Tolthar wrote:
And your proof for this is?

Daily physical observations - the same reason I know gravity has not been falsified. So far, in all of my personal experiences, I have encountered no case where the 'Free Will' hypothesis has been demonstrated as false. People seems capable of acting on their own volitions without limits (other than the obvious laws of physics - a person cannot 'will' themselves to fly after jumping off a cliff, etc.). In cases where potential choices arise, there doesn't seem to be an internal or external control mechanism limiting volition. That does not mean that they (internal or external controls) do not exist - only that they have not yet been observed.

This is really very simple - if you view 'Free Will' as a hypothesis (you must, of course, define what 'Free Will' is, epistomologically, but once that is done you can use it as a working model), there are two possible versions:
'Free Will exists' or 'Free Will does not exist'

Since you can't prove a negative, the second hypothesis is logically untestable. Therefore, you start with the hypothesis 'Free Will exists', and watch for observations that would falsify the statement. If you don't encounter any, the hypothesis remains viable (you can be 'reasonably certain' of it, to use the nomenclature).

AT

[Arakasi Takeda]

Sophid take note -

Outsider wrote:
Proving contradictions is the fuel of self-esteem of bad philosophers. No one here would appreciate that sort of thing, except, maybe, Arakasi Takeda.

Again, the first direct interaction between myself and another poster on this forum - Outsider - and he/she choses an underhanded slap at my person. So if I appear 'unfriendly' in my following responses, I want you to note for the record exactly where it started and what exactly engendered it.

Now Outsider, let's take a look at your statements:

Outsider wrote:
If you see a contradiction don't try to prove that it exists. That doesn't make you appear smart and sophisticated. It makes you look like you aren't dedicated to finding the truth.

So we shouldn't use a contradiction in a philosophy as evidence it needs to be examined? We shouldn't question whether or not a contradiction has bearing on the 'truth-value' of a philosophy?

How then, Outsider, does one determine the truth value of a philosophy? If an apparent contradiction doesn't invalidate a series of logical reasonings, what does? Sounds to me like you are suggesting that we should ignore obvious contradictions and simply accept something as truth - in which case you are making the argument by dogma and need some serious introspection.

Second, I noted your predilection for using mathematical formulations in your proofs - I can only assume you do so because it lends an air of sophistication to your arguments. Of course, if you are going to use mathematical formulation, it helps if you use it properly.

Suppose X stands for a man. X1,X2,...Xn are individual people.

Okay so far.

We know that F (stands for force) is bad for X. F(Xi)=Bad for any i between 1 and n.

How, in your opinion, do we 'know' this? I assume you mean axiomatically, since you have offered no proof of it. Objectivism defines force to be necessarily bad I suppose, except when the force is being used to uphold a legitimate legal contract. In which case F(Xi) = Good, provided Xi is the aggrieved party for whom Force is utilized. Your defining function F(X) hasn't given any information on the full relationship between F and Xi, a fact that will come back to create more problems in your later analysis.

But, we want to prove that F(X)=Good.
So here is how we do it:
We define Y=X1+X2+...+Xn. Now, since Y is a sum of X's, it preserves the "mold and characteristics" of X. So Let's treat Y like another X and call it X_Big (X_Big is society, treated as a single human unit).

You've defined the relationship between each individuals as additive, which, again, does not reflect the true relationship between these. Your conclusion is going to be falsifiable because of this mistake.

Outsider wrote:Now if F(X1) Produces wealth, then Y has wealth. Now wealth given to some specific person may be good or bad for him, depending on his life, desires, etc'. But wealth for Y is always good, since Y is a weird average of people. It cannot be said to have a personality or life, but it still needs wealth to maintain physical life. So we establish that F(Y)=Good. Now Y is really X_Big that we recall from before, and therefore F(Xi)=Good. Case proven, we feel very sophisticated.

When I say that your conclusion is falsifiable, this is what I mean; you assume Y is always positive (Good). That might not be the case. What is X1's weath value is positive (say, +1), but it comes at the expense of twice the amount of wealth from X2 (-2). The total of Y would be negative, indicating Y is -Good (or Bad, if you prefer), for that case. F(Y) does not therefore always equal Good. It can equal good or bad, depending on the relationships you provide between the individuals and their relative values.

You fail to prove anything because you have really not defined anything in your argument.

Your argument is neither logical nor convincing. You've attempted to create something that appears sophisticated, but only fools those who don't know what they are actually looking at. And you have made, as your summation, the extremely poor assertion that contradictions in logic don't matter. THAT is the sign of a bad philosopher.


AT

[Tolthar Lockbar]

You can start from there to catch up on the conversation.
I believe you are correct in your second assertion though, that neither of you has claimed any kind of 'omniscient' knowledge.

Right.

Objectivism uses a concept of 'absolute truth', but the definition is changed to suggest that such truths are grounded either in direct observation or are rational foundations - the rules by which reason is governed (axioms, if you will, for the process of reason).

I think a better way of saying this is: Objectivism uses the word for its logical meaning. Kant's has no meaning that fits to reality.

So falsification means, find a contradiction? Why the focus on it? The focus should be on the affirming knowledge, and when a contradiction is found, look into the concept hierarchy for a flaw.

I guess I don't see any meaningful difference in this falsification method of yours. It seems to just make the meaning of "find a contradiction" into one word.

Daily physical observations - the same reason I know gravity has not been falsified. So far, in all of my personal experiences, I have encountered no case where the 'Free Will' hypothesis has been demonstrated as false. People seems capable of acting on their own volitions without limits (other than the obvious laws of physics - a person cannot 'will' themselves to fly after jumping off a cliff, etc.). In cases where potential choices arise, there doesn't seem to be an internal or external control mechanism limiting volition. That does not mean that they (internal or external controls) do not exist - only that they have not yet been observed.

Can you point me at the proof in this? Before this falsification method has any use at all, first proof of knowledge has to come first.

It seems like this whole statement here is, "well, since I can't find anything against it, its true."

The rest of the post about looking for contradictions is pointless without first having proof in the first place. We can go back to it if we can agree on some proof first.

[Arakasi Takeda]

Tolthar wrote:
I think a better way of saying this is: Objectivism uses the word for its logical meaning. Kant's has no meaning that fits to reality.

It's a better way to say it within your philosophical framework, you mean. Kant believed his version was very logical, reasonable, and 'fit with reality'. The reason it doesn't make sense to you is because you realize that Kant's philosophy is of very little merit.

But you can't assume your philosophy is automatically 'right' or 'true', just because Kant's is wrong. It must stand on it's own merits. It's not that Kant's is wrong because it 'doesn't fit with reality' - it's wrong because our philosophical systems do not suffer from the same logical inconsistencies as Kant's, which is a measure of their 'truth' value in relation to reality.

Tolthar wrote:
Can you point me at the proof in this? Before this falsification method has any use at all, first proof of knowledge has to come first.

You'd have to read Popper to understand why the above statement is philosophically 'incorrect'. Basically, David Hume proposed a skeptical argument for why knowledge by 'induction' from a 'proof of knoweldge' to reality is impossible. Popper started with Hume's skeptical analysis, and proposed a new definition of knowledge, in which 'Truth' is always in the process of being sought, but never quite reached. You never 'prove' anything true. All you can do is start with a hypothesis, and try to prove it wrong. The more specific the piece of 'knowledge', the easier it should be to falsify. If physical observation still fails to falsify it, then our hypothesis has a quality Popper calls 'verisimilitude' meaning 'closeness or proximity to truth'.

A longer outline can be found here:
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subje ... popper.htm

The 'process' of falsification starts with a 'theory', or what you might refer to as a 'abstract concept' in the realm of Objectivist philosophy. You create an initial hypothesis from direct physical observation.

For instance - you look up at the moon one night, and notice that the shadow cast on it is circular. From that, you hypothesize that the Earth, which is casting the shadow, is spherical.

From there, you attempt to falsify the hypothesis, by sailing ships around the world to see if they fall off, or trying to find an edge, etc. Later, you send satellites out to photograph the Earth, or have laser measurments of the Earth's curvature made from the moon. Each new observation refines your hypothesis of the shape of the Earth by degrees of certainty (now we know that, for all intents and purposes, the earth is an oblong spheroid with a rough surface).

That doesn't mean we know the earth is spherical as an 'absolute truth'; it means we are relatively certain the Earth is spherical based on countless direct observations designed to try to falsify that hypothesis, but which have failed to do so.

Now, you might be tempted to just say 'well, so far, everything seems to indicate the Earth is round, so we'll take it as 'proven', but to do so is a symantic concept, not a logical result. You don't know omnisciently that ever measurement you take in the future will give you the same result, so you haven't actually _proven_ it absolutely. You only have the closest approximation to truth you can achieve (high vermisilitude).

Tolthar wrote:
It seems like this whole statement here is, "well, since I can't find anything against it, its true."

Not at all - 'Truth' as a concept is very touchy in Popper. As I said, nothing is ever proven absolutely true. It only approaches truth. All we can say is that we are reasonably confortable with a hypothesis, that is appears to approach truth (has high vermisilitude), and that it has not been proven false.

We might say that something is 'true' (lower case t) when we have so much supporting (non-falsifying) observations that the vermisilitude is very high. For instance, I might call evolution or gravity 'true' because of the high amount of evidence in their favor. But both are still technically scientific hypothesis that have not been proven True (upper case T).

The rest of the post about looking for contradictions is pointless without first having proof in the first place. We can go back to it if we can agree on some proof first. [/quote]

You can't have a 'proof of truth'. In Popperian philosophy, there's no such thing. It's a unicorn, a chimera, a fantasy. All you can get is a search for knowledge steadily _approaching_ truth.

Think of 'Truth' in Popper as a sort of platitude, if you will - a word whose meaning is not absolute, but, in Popper, means 'possessing very high vermisilitude'. It is rarely used because it has no valuable epistomological meaning other than as an approximation.


AT

[Tolthar Lockbar]

Okay, so if I lift a rock, and drop the rock, it would be wrong of me to say "I absolutely DID drop that rock."?

[Outsider]

AT wrote: Again, the first direct interaction between myself and another poster on this forum - Outsider - and he/she chooses an underhanded slap at my person. So if I appear 'unfriendly' in my following responses, I want you to note for the record exactly where it started and what exactly engendered it.

After reading enough of this thread and your posts it is pretty obvious to me that your purpose here is to prove (maybe to yourself) that all those who "follow" Ayn Rand are blind believers who do not use reason but faith, and that her philosophy is full of contradictions.
Perhaps it gives you some form of satisfaction, perhaps you honestly believe that if a person agrees with AR he must be a brick-head. Too bad.
How did I observe the above about you? First hint was opening post: You ask "if you see a scientific proof that what AR said about humans is false, what would you think?"
The only conclusion this sentence is begging to achieve is that Rand "followers" are brickheads. The sentence is phrased in a way that begs a person to admit such a thing (i.e. "I remain loyal to AR despite evidence. All evidence is nonsense unless said by AR".)
Second, I saw some instances of ignoring questions, and instead attacking the way the person sounds or appears.
Third - plenty of annoying nitpicking to words, and recombining them to make the person sound stupid. I did not get an honest approach of trying to understand, but rather an attempt to present the person talking to you as a foolish brick-head.

So that is why I said what I said. I can see when someone is debating while honestly trying to answer the other person's claims, and when they are just trying to show the other person as ridiculous. You do the second, in my opinion.

[Arakasi Takeda]

Tolthar wrote:
Okay, so if I lift a rock, and drop the rock, it would be wrong of me to say "I absolutely DID drop that rock."?

I suppose that would depend on how you were using the word 'absolutely' in this context, and how far back the logic chain you wanted to go.

To explain:

1) Using the common venacular of 'absolutely', there's no problem. We assume your senses accurately reflect what is going on in the real world, and, therefore, you made an observation of the rock dropping.

2) You could use a stronger version of the word 'absolutely', which requires us to go backwards down the justification chain:

Are our senses a true representation of what actually occurs in the real world - we have good vermisilitude to that effect, but it isn't a Kantian absolute. Since we're reasonably certain of this, your use should be okay.

Also, are our memories a true representation of a past observation? Again, we have good vermisilitude on that conjecture, but it is't a Kantian absolute.

Within reasonable scope, your statement is perfectly fine. You just have to understand that the criterion for determination of what consitutes knowledge has a different basis in Popper vs Aristotle.


AT

[Oleksandr]

Within reasonable scope, your statement is perfectly fine. You just have to understand that the criterion for determination of what constitutes knowledge has a different basis in Popper vs Aristotle.

No, what you have to understand is that Popper is a retard alongside with Plato, Kant, and the rest of bunch. Their views on what is absolute certainty or truth is completely unreal; it cannot be achieved ever. They say. A human can't know anything for sure, just as you say.

Look, AT, Peikoff had a very nice phrase to describe your case - "Mental Suicide." You are simply incapable of induction. All you can do is get stuck in logic and deduction and floating abstractions.

You can't even make a cohesive post because that. Your posts read like they were written by 10 people with different definitions, opinions, and philosophy. Again, that's so because you lack ability to properly integrate.

If you wish, you may shout that you were abused and run away and hide. What I said is now a matter of fact after your many posts on TTi forums that serve as an evidence to anybody but you since you can't integrate anything into anything even to save your own life.


That said I won't ban you. You are somewhat amusing to "debate" with b/c of your inability to integrate, so for now you have a purpose on these forums.

[Arakasi Takeda]

After reading enough of this thread and your posts it is pretty obvious to me that your purpose here is to prove (maybe to yourself) that all those who "follow" Ayn Rand are blind believers who do not use reason but faith, and that her philosophy is full of contradictions.
Perhaps it gives you some form of satisfaction, perhaps you honestly believe that if a person agrees with AR he must be a brick-head. Too bad.

How did I observe the above about you? First hint was opening post: You ask "if you see a scientific proof that what AR said about humans is false, what would you think?"

The only conclusion this sentence is begging to achieve is that Rand "followers" are brickheads. The sentence is phrased in a way that begs a person to admit such a thing (i.e. "I remain loyal to AR despite evidence. All evidence is nonsense unless said by AR".)

I find your observation above really curious, because when I proposed the question, my intent was actually to ask a question, not make an accusation. I was genuinely curious as to the response people here would have.

Why would it be automatic that Objectivists would reject the scientific data? Objectivism has two philosophical foundations. One is direct observation - so obviously Objectivists give scientific observation philosophical 'weight'. However, Objectivism also has a rationalist foundation, meaning that specific parts of the philosophy are grounding directly in logical reasoning. One very important aspect of logical reasoning is the concept of non-contradiction.

Do you not find it to be a genuinely interesting paradox that it is theoretically possible to have a direct observation cause a contradiction? Under such a condition, which foundation of Objectivism has precedent?

I never presupposed anyone's answer. I just made the query.

The only person presuming intent here is you. You've decided that I am a malicious influence, and so anything I write or ask must have nefarious intent.

Second, I saw some instances of ignoring questions, and instead attacking the way the person sounds or appears.

No one answers every question posed in these threads. The reason my responses are so huge is because I try to answer more than others. There have been several individuals complaining about the lengths of posts, so you pick and chose.

If there is a specific question I ignored that you feel it is imperative for me to answer, please present it. I am not adverse to going back and picking up dropped conversations. But please supply the specific examples.

Third - plenty of annoying nitpicking to words, and recombining them to make the person sound stupid. I did not get an honest approach of trying to understand, but rather an attempt to present the person talking to you as a foolish brick-head.

Again, I'd like to see a specific example of this. Particularly if you claim is I am 're-writing' individual's quotes.

As far as 'nitpicking' words - epistomology is a major branch of the philosophy discipline, which is interested specifically in the choice and usage of specific words and definitions. If we are to have a useful dialogue about specific philosophical ideas, we must understand the exact choice of words and their definitions in context. So yes, I do ask for clairifications of people's use of words, and whether they have a specific meaning I interpreted or not. If people sound stupid, it's not my intent - my intent is to get at the individual's precise meaning and usage of the language.

So that is why I said what I said. I can see when someone is debating while honestly trying to answer the other person's claims, and when they are just trying to show the other person as ridiculous. You do the second, in my opinion.

Then I feel your interpretation is completely wrong. Mine was an honest question - if you chose to see it as an accusation, then the fault in the interpretation is entirely yours to bear.

What I notice most about your comments, though, is one simple fact - rather than engage in a debate, you prefer to paint me as a troll.

Te one thing you haven't done is actually answer the question.

So I ask - which of us is actually interested in a debate, and which one is throwing insults?


AT

[Arakasi Takeda]

Oleksandr wrote:
blah, blah, blah.....

Seriously Olek, there's nothing in your post worth answering. You couldn't argue your way out of a paper bag, so you'll forgive me if I take zero stock of your valuation of my arguments.

Every conversation we have ends in an insult and a threat from you. Your ultimate answer to every challenge is Force. Not only do you possess zero understanding of philosophy outside your narrow world view, you can't even keep to its (Objectivism's) fundamentals.

Spare me your attitude, your rejoiners, and your threats of banning. If you feel the need to make a fool of yourself by flexing your administrative muscle here, you might at least maintain some personal dignity by not announcing your weakness to everyone on the board.

[Edit] - and before I have to deal with someone telling me 'Olek didn't threaten you' - let me give a simple demonstration:

Question) Ask yourself - why did Olek write 'I won't ban you'?

1) No one says anything without a reason.

2)If he truly had no intention of banning me, or making an implicit threat, then there is no reason to bring the subject up at all. That would be pointless.

3) See #1

The only reason to bring the subject up at all is to use it as a threat. Even more ridiculous, he attempts to suggest that he is mercifuly withholding it...a common trait of thugs.

AT

[Tolthar Lockbar]

Think of 'Truth' in Popper as a sort of platitude, if you will - a word whose meaning is not absolute, but, in Popper, means 'possessing very high vermisilitude'. It is rarely used because it has no valuable epistemological meaning other than as an approximation.

I think I see my problem with your epistemology, at least more explicitly now. I was having trouble proving you wrong because I was using some of your definitions. I actually didn't realize how you were redefining things like 'truth'.

Plato, as you probably know, had his concept of 'The Forms'. He said that perfect concepts exists in some alternate reality not perceivable by humans. So while someone can strive for perfection, they can never reach it because perfection is not a human thing, its something 'beyond' human.

How you are defining "truth" is in this matter. Truth is the recognition of what exists with the use of reason--and, reason, is a human thing. In fact, it seems like you are accepting Plato's definition style of things, but then making new concepts to rationalize them. I fail to see the need for this idea of "falsification" if one uses rational concepts. That is the point of Aristotelian/Objectivist epistemology in how it is different than Platonian epistemology.

Now if all you mean by "falsification" is the process of finding a contradiction with the use of reason (inductive or deductive), then I agree with it--though then it would just be the same thing as 'finding a contradiction'.

EDIT: to fix my quote brackets

[Arakasi Takeda]

I think I see my problem with your epistemology, at least more explicitly now....

Plato, as you probably know, had his concept of 'The Forms'. He said that perfect concepts exists in some alternate reality not perceivable by humans. So while someone can strive for perfection, they can never reach it because perfection is not a human thing, its something 'beyond' human.

How you are defining "truth" is in this matter. ...That is the point of Aristotelian/Objectivist epistemology in how it is different than Platonian epistemology.

Sorry for the quick cut - just condensing for space. I think you have the right idea, but the wrong outcome in regards to Popper's view on the subject.

I mentioned that Popper was uncomfortable of the term 'absolute truth' because it was 'value-laden'; what he meant was that too many people used the words 'absolute truth' with a Kantian (or Platonic) definition in mind. In fact, Popper rejects that usage of the term explicitly, in the same way as Aristotelian/Objectivist epistomology.

But, where Objectivism uses a redefinition of the word Truth (as 'that which exists with reason', instead of the 'perfection' of Plato), Popper instead created a new term without the already existing baggage. He defines this term as 'Vermisilitude' - the condition of being near the Truth. If 'Truth' is the Platonic perfection, vermisilitude is the condition of trying to get closer and closer to perfection, while recognizing that 'the real, human world' is imperfect. We cannot achieve Platonic Truth, but we can try to get close to what is 'really there' by using abstractions of physical observations, and 'trimming' those abstractions into tighter and tighter definitions by weeding them of contradictions.

That is what falsification is - the process of finding a contradiction between phyiscal observation and a current hypothesis. Such a contradiction demonstrates a weakness in the hypothesis. To increase the vermisilitude of that hypothesis, it must be 'edited' to remove the contradiction and bring that hypothesis more in line with the direct physical observation.

That's the scientific process in a nutshell - observe a phenomenon, suggest a theory for its origin, then test the theory by making more observations. Where the observations continue to support the hypothesis, you are on the right track (having high vermisilitude). When a contradiction occurs, the hypothesis must be remade to take the new observation into account.

It isn't Popper that is 'redefining truth'. It's actually Objectivism using a different epistomology for the word 'Truth'. Truth is so bogged down in Platonic and Kantian usage that Popper effectively got rid of it to prevent confusion between his epistomology and the ancient usage. Unfortunately, so many philosophers are so stuck in the concept of 'truth' that he had to create a term to show them a relationship between their version of truth and his measure of the 'accuracy' of a hypothesis to physical observation.

In this way, I honestly believe that Objectivism and Popperian philosophy overlap - they are both grounded in physical observation and are attempting to get at 'knowledge of the real world.'

The major difference between the two can be summed up in two objections Popper has of Aristotilean logic. First is the problem of induction, introduced by David Hume. According to Hume, the process of obtaining knowledge by induction has a serious philosophical weakness - observations of individuals cannot be logically extrapolated to groups as a whole under all time and all circumstances. Because human beings are limited, an individual observation you have today isn't guaranteed to be true forever. It's the generalization fallacy - nothing more complex than that. Hume's example is thus:

X swan is black ----> All swans are black is a fallacious statement.

Just because an individual observation is one way does not guarantee that all subsequent observations are the same.

The only way to be 'absolutely certain' that an abstraction from the specific to the general is true in all cases at all times would require Kantian omniscience, which human beings do not possess. Therefore, all knowledge created by induction suffers from a potential weakness.

Hume basically uses this argument to state that knowledge is never absolute. Popper took this argument and turned it on its head - since induction was prone to this error, knowledge should be gained by _deduction_ alone. You can generate a hypothesis by way of induction, but you can't know it is absolutely true. But what you can do is then _deduce_ logical, testable predictions from that hypothesis, and use physical observations to try to falsify (contradict) those predictions, and, thus, make better and better hypotheses. You could 'approach' truth, even if you couldn't absolutely reach it.


AT

[Edit] - I realized after submitting this that I alluded to, but didn't outline, Popper's other objection. If you are interested, we can go into it (It revolves around Aristotliean definitions), but the 'problem of induction' is a major discontinuity between Objectivism and Popper. To Objectivism, induction is equally valid to deduction as a source of knowledge. To Popper, it is not, based on Hume's problem of induction.

[Tolthar Lockbar]

I mentioned that Popper was uncomfortable of the term 'absolute truth' because it was 'value-laden'; what he meant was that too many people used the words 'absolute truth' with a Kantian (or Platonic) definition in mind. In fact, Popper rejects that usage of the term explicitly, in the same way as Aristotelian/Objectivist epistomology.

I reject that usage outright as well. Its a false concept that doesn't fit to reality. The difference is: I then don't use the false concept to explain other concepts. If a concept is not practical, then it shouldn't be used. But you seem to be using it to explain your point (like you do in all the following statements). Objectivism merely uses the logical definition of it based on reason.

Later you also claim that deduction can give you knowledge with certainty, but not induction. Let me ask you this, can you give me an example of deduction without the use of induction as any of the premises?

Lastly, how can you be certain of a falsification? How can you be sure of your senses (like you said previously) when seeing this physical contradiction?

[Arakasi Takeda]

reject that usage outright as well. Its a false concept that doesn't fit to reality. The difference is: I then don't use the false concept to explain other concepts. If a concept is not practical, then it shouldn't be used. But you seem to be using it to explain your point (like you do in all the following statements). Objectivism merely uses the logical definition of it based on reason.

Again, you missed the point - Popper was only interested in the concept of the accuracy of a hypothesis to physical observation. In his original writeup, the word Truth doesn't ever appear.

The reason Popper ends up using the word Truth later is because of the insistence of other philosophers. They wanted to understand how his philosophy related to the concept of truth. In order to explain a relationship (that he was uneasy of drawing), he had to create a previously undefined concept of vermisilitude.

Popperians (if that can be said to be a word) don't use the word 'Truth' unless they are talking to someone with a philosophy that uses that concept. The only reason I use the word truth at all in this conversation is because Objectivism uses the term. Unfortunately, the way truth would be used in regards to Popper is related to the erroneous concept as outlined by Kant and Plato.

Later you also claim that deduction can give you knowledge with certainty, but not induction. Let me ask you this, can you give me an example of deduction without the use of induction as any of the premises?

This is also a false problem - the issue is not whether or not induction is used, but what _value_ it has in creating knowledge. A hypothesis is an induction by phyiscal observation, but it is _NOT_ regarded as knowledge in and of itself. It possesses NO value of certainty. It's just a hypothesis - a working template. Knowledge is the result of falsification applied to an inducted hypothesis - the act of increasing vermisilitude.

Objectivism suggests that induction grants knowledge. Popper states that induction is _not_ knowledge, though it is a necessary step to making knowledge achievable.

Lastly, how can you be certain of a falsification? How can you be sure of your senses (like you said previously) when seeing this physical contradiction?

I mentioned that Popper was uncomfortable of the term 'absolute truth' because it was 'value-laden'; what he meant was that too many people used the words 'absolute truth' with a Kantian (or Platonic) definition in mind. In fact, Popper rejects that usage of the term explicitly, in the same way as Aristotelian/Objectivist epistomology.

I reject that usage outright as well. Its a false concept that doesn't fit to reality. The difference is: I then don't use the false concept to explain other concepts. If a concept is not practical, then it shouldn't be used. But you seem to be using it to explain your point (like you do in all the following statements). Objectivism merely uses the logical definition of it based on reason.

Later you also claim that deduction can give you knowledge with certainty, but not induction. Let me ask you this, can you give me an example of deduction without the use of induction as any of the premises?

Lastly, how can you be certain of a falsification? How can you be sure of your senses (like you said previously) when seeing this physical contradiction?

You can't in the 'absolute' sense. Any single observation may be an error of the senses, for instance. That is why you verify physical observations multiple times. If a single experiment creates a null result, you double check it for error. If the contradiction appears again and again, you know you have a problem in the theory.

The only thing that would completely blow falsification out of the water would be a demonstration that physical observation could never falsify something - that is, you could never be reasonably certain of your physical observations. However, this would effectively nullify Objectivism as well (and most other philosophies based on objective reality). The only thing that would be left is absolute Skepticism - the condition of truly never being certain of everything (what Olek seems dead set on trying to claim Popperian falsification is).

I'm hoping that you realize the difference - Popperian falsification is dependent upon the idea that our senses do reflect reality (just as Objectivism is). That _is_ an assumption (we can't be absolutely certain), but our ability to make hypothesis, test them, and get rational results seems to be good evidence that it works.

Now, let me off you a counter example, and ask you to justify the utility of induction:

Every day, when I get up, I see the sun rising in the east. It's been like that every day of my life. Induction tells me, from the specific to the general, that the sun will ALWAYS rise in the east.

But, as a scientist interested in astronomy, I know that such an induction is potentially false. A number of different scenarios could change the Earth's rotation, or the status of the sun. A strike by a fast moving massive asteroid could impart enough momentum on the planet to alter it's rotation towards the opposite direction, for instance. I also know that, in roughly 5 billion years, the sun will swell up and engulf the earth, and the idea of 'east' will be completely meaningless. I know that what induction tells me is wrong, and, yet, there is no way that my daily observations of the sun could induce for me the knowledge of the scenarios I just outlined.

So, prove me wrong - how could induction, from the daily observation of the sun's rising every day in the east grant me the knowledge that this will _not_ always happen? Demonstrate that knowledge by induction is always accurate compared by the deduction of those scenarios from the theories of physics and astronomy.


AT

[Tolthar Lockbar]

Demonstrate that knowledge by induction is always accurate compared by the deduction of those scenarios from the theories of physics and astronomy.

I would have to ask you this: Accurate by what standard?

[Tolthar Lockbar]

This is also a false problem - the issue is not whether or not induction is used, but what _value_ it has in creating knowledge. A hypothesis is an induction by phyiscal observation, but it is _NOT_ regarded as knowledge in and of itself. It possesses NO value of certainty. It's just a hypothesis - a working template. Knowledge is the result of falsification applied to an inducted hypothesis - the act of increasing vermisilitude.

Value to who? If its value to me, then I'd say that I use the knowledge gained from induction greatly!

[Arakasi Takeda]

I would have to ask you this: Accurate by what standard?

By your own, of course.

The contention is that induction can lead to certain and true knowledge, just as deduction can.

I therefore want you to create, via induction only, a certain and true knowledge of the sun. Your daily observations of the sun are the specific case. We know what the correct answer is - modern science tells us that it will not always be the case that the sun rises in the east (if for no other reason that, eventually, the sun and earth will cease to exist).

I want you to connect the dots from the specific to the general case.

(specific) Every single day, the sun rises in the east ------> The sun will not always rise in the east (general)

I contend that it is not possible to do so. Induction alone, from the specific daily observations of the sun, cannot give you the result outlined. Not only can it not give the correct answer, but proper reasoned induction will, in fact, gives the exact opposite result - the sun will always rise in the east. Therefore, reasoning by induction gives a false answer and therefore cannot be trusted to give absolute true knowledge.

And, to anticipate the usual answer (as Hume did), you can try to fall back on more 'foundational' inductions (try inducting conservation of energy, gravitation, etc, and then _deduce_ the correct answer from those), but, ever time you do, you are required to justify those inductions as well. If you have read Hume, you should already know the result

If not, we can discuss it after your first attempt.

AT

[Tolthar Lockbar]

The sun will rise in the east tomorrow. If you want to gauge the value of this statement, then that would depend on your own knowledge (if you are talking about your value). I personally would have no problems depending on it.

You can't call deductive logic any more valuable though. All deductive logic has inductive logic as its premise. So the only value you can get from knowledge in the first place is derived through inductive logic.

Now we could say that reality might be different than that, but reality to who? Yes, there is an objective reality, but only humans can induce it. You can not take concepts out of the context of humans. You are doing this with truth (I'll explain below).

That term, verisimilitude, is actually accepting Plato's version of the word truth. Your method of falsification is trying to weed out contradictions to approach Plato's definition of truth.

Induction is harder than deduction. It requires knowing when you have seen enough for whatever value you want from it, but it is the ONLY means of gaining knowledge in the first place. Deduction can only come _after_ induction.

edit: to remove a quote I didn't mean to quote.

[Arakasi Takeda]

Value to who? If its value to me, then I'd say that I use the knowledge gained from induction greatly!

Value here is not a measure of utility, as you are using it. By value we mean 'truth value' - is a statement true or false, in the Aristotliean mode.

The truth value of the statement "The sun will always rise in the east" is false, by our modern scientific understanding. Induction by daily observation, however, will always yield the value 'true' - if the sun rises in the east every day it is observed (counted as 'true' in the specific instance), the induction to the general is that 'The sun will always rise in the east' is also true. The induction, arrived through reason, yields the wrong result.


AT

[Tolthar Lockbar]

The truth value of the statement "The sun will always rise in the east" is false, by our modern scientific understanding. Induction by daily observation, however, will always yield the value 'true' - if the sun rises in the east every day it is observed (counted as 'true' in the specific instance), the induction to the general is that 'The sun will always rise in the east' is also true. The induction, arrived through reason, yields the wrong result.

While this is true, it is not deduction that showed it as a contradiction, it was other induction. In order to find a contradiction in induction, one must use other induction.

[Arakasi Takeda]

Before going further, Tolthar, I need an 'epistomological clarification' of my own from you.

1) How are you defining the word 'Knowledge' in the context of this discussion.

2) You hold that induction is of equal 'value' to deduction - (by which you seem to imply utility). From that, can I assume that you would hold that knowledge arrived at by induction is as certain as knowledge arrived at by deduction?

3) The ongoing discussion with Olek has been over whether any knowledge can be know as 'certain' - based on your responses to the first two questions, do you hold that knowledge derived from induction is certain or merely useful?

4) As a further clarification, it might to useful to know how you and Olek are defining 'certain', in this context.



AT

[Oleksandr]

Moderator note: a new rule for Deep Thoughts section is now in effect, starting from this post.

See details and reasoning for it: http://shite.homelinux.org/forum/viewto ... f=3&t=3864

One and only rule:
Do not make claims that Objectivism says something without a direct quote from one of Objectivist works.

[Outsider]

AT, a person interested in a discussion about some topic makes it their business to know what they are talking about. Instead, you are trying to talk (I mean refute) Objectivism, without having a damn clue what it is. There is not a single post when you do not make fabricated assumptions about Objectivism, then continue to discuss them in length. This is not a person interested in debate or in knowledge. This is a person interested in listening to his own pretty words and ideas.

Just to give a small example: Oleksandr asked you what is the standard you use to judge if a proof is good or not. You replied with a dialoge describing how ridiculous he sounds while explaining an axiom.

I am certain that you do not want to learn: you want to prove. You do not want to learn, You want to appear as if you've proven something.

[Oleksandr]

Moderator note: the thread has been split away from Capitalist topic.

EDIT: see previous topic here: http://shite.homelinux.org/forum/viewto ... 624#p31624